Journal article
Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
Economic theory, Vol.35(3), pp.407-440
06/01/2008
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0249-0
Abstract
Discontinuous games, such as auctions, may require special tie-breaking rules to guarantee equilibrium existence. The best results available ensure equilibrium existence only in mixed strategy with endogenously defined tie-breaking rules and communication of private information. We show that an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is sufficient for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a class of auctions. The rule is explicitly defined and does not require communication of private information. We also characterize when special tie-breaking rules are really needed.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
- Creators
- Aloisio Araujo - Fundação Getulio VargasLuciano I. de Castro - Universidad Carlos III de MadridHumberto Moreira - Fundação Getulio Vargas
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economic theory, Vol.35(3), pp.407-440
- Publisher
- Springer Nature
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00199-007-0249-0
- ISSN
- 0938-2259
- eISSN
- 1432-0479
- Number of pages
- 34
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 06/01/2008
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380421902771
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