Journal article
Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates
Games and economic behavior, Vol.42(2), pp.183-207
02/01/2003
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00541-9
Abstract
This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates
- Creators
- Rabah Amir - UCLouvainIgor Evstigneev - University of ManchesterJohn Wooders - University of Arizona
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Games and economic behavior, Vol.42(2), pp.183-207
- Publisher
- Elsevier Inc
- DOI
- 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00541-9
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
- eISSN
- 1090-2473
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 02/01/2003
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380425302771
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