Nonemptiness of the Alpha‐Core

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha; Nicholas C. Yannelis

doi:10.1111/jpet.70097

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Nonemptiness of the Alpha‐Core

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Journal of public economic theory, Vol.28(1), e70097

02/2026

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70097

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Abstract

We prove nonemptiness of the ‐core for balanced games with nonordered preferences, extending and generalizing in several aspects the results of Scarf (1971), Border (1984), Florenzano (1989), Yannelis (1991b), and Kajii (1992). In particular, we answer an open question in Kajii (1992) regarding the applicability of the nonemptiness results to models with infinite‐dimensional strategy spaces. We provide two models with Knightian and voting preferences for which the results of Scarf (1971) and Kajii (1992) cannot be applied, while our nonemptiness result applies.

cooperative game theory

games in normal form

Knightian uncertainty

nonordered preferences

alpha $\alpha $-core

Details

Title: Subtitle: Nonemptiness of the Alpha‐Core
Creators: V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL
Nicholas C. Yannelis - University of Iowa
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Journal of public economic theory, Vol.28(1), e70097
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70097
ISSN: 1097-3923
eISSN: 1467-9779
Publisher: Wiley
Language: English
Date published: 02/2026
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9985121482802771

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