ON ZERMELO'S THEOREM

Rabah Amir; Igor V. Evstigneev

doi:10.3934/jdg.2017011

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Journal article

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ON ZERMELO'S THEOREM

Rabah Amir and Igor V. Evstigneev

Journal of dynamics and games, Vol.4(3), pp.191-194

2017

DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2017011

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Abstract

A famous result in game theory known as Zermelo's theorem says that "in chess either White can force a win, or Black can force a win, or both sides can force at least a draw". The present paper extends this result to the class of all finite-stage two-player games of complete information with alternating moves. It is shown that in any such game either the first player has a winning strategy, or the second player has a winning strategy, or both have unbeatable strategies.

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Physical Sciences

Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications

Science & Technology

Details

Title: Subtitle: ON ZERMELO'S THEOREM
Creators: Rabah Amir - Univ Iowa, Dept Econ, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
Igor V. Evstigneev - University of Manchester
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Journal of dynamics and games, Vol.4(3), pp.191-194
DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2017011
ISSN: 2164-6066
eISSN: 2164-6074
Publisher: Amer Inst Mathematical Sciences-Aims
Number of pages: 4
Language: English
Date published: 2017
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9984380492402771

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