On Strategic Complementarity Conditions in Bertrand Oligopoly

Rabah Amir; Isabel Grilo

doi:10.1007/s00199-002-0283-x

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On Strategic Complementarity Conditions in Bertrand Oligopoly

Journal article

Peer reviewed

On Strategic Complementarity Conditions in Bertrand Oligopoly

Rabah Amir and Isabel Grilo

Economic theory, Vol.22(1), pp.227-232

08/01/2003

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0283-x

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Abstract

For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single (counter-)example that: (i) A new monotone transformation of the firms' profit functions may lead to the supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations both fail to do so, and (ii) Topkis's notion of critical sufficient condition for monotonicity of a Bertrand firm's best-reply correspondence cannot be extended to rely only on positive unit costs.

Duopolies

Economic theory

Exposita Notes

Marginal costs

Mathematical monotonicity

Mathematical transformations

Oligopolies

Sufficient conditions

Unit costs

Details

Title: Subtitle: On Strategic Complementarity Conditions in Bertrand Oligopoly
Creators: Rabah Amir - UCLouvain
Isabel Grilo - European Commission
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Economic theory, Vol.22(1), pp.227-232
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0283-x
ISSN: 0938-2259
eISSN: 1432-0479
Language: English
Date published: 08/01/2003
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9984380415002771

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