Journal article
On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information
Journal of economic theory, Vol.184, p.104925
11/2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.012
Abstract
This paper develops a new approach to investigating equilibrium existence in first-price auctions with many asymmetric bidders whose types are affiliated and valuations are interdependent and not necessarily strictly increasing in own type. We begin with studying a number of continuity-related properties of the model, which are used, in conjunction with tieless single crossing and H-convexity, to establish the existence of monotone approximate interim equilibria. Then we provide two sets of sufficient conditions for the game to have a sequence of monotone approximate equilibria whose limit points are pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information
- Creators
- Pavlo Prokopovych - Kyiv School of EconomicsNicholas C. Yannelis - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of economic theory, Vol.184, p.104925
- Publisher
- Elsevier Inc
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.012
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
- eISSN
- 1095-7235
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 11/2019
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380400502771
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