Journal article
On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium
Economic theory, Vol.38(2), pp.351-369
02/01/2009
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0332-1
Abstract
It is shown that a non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium may not be coalitionally Bayesian incentive compatible, may not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not belong to the weak fine core and thus may not be fully Pareto optimal. These negative results lead us to conclude the non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium is not a sensible solution concept.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium
- Creators
- Dionysius Glycopantis - Lead City UniversityAllan Muir - Lead City UniversityNicholas C. Yannelis - University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economic theory, Vol.38(2), pp.351-369
- Publisher
- Springer Nature
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00199-008-0332-1
- ISSN
- 0938-2259
- eISSN
- 1432-0479
- Number of pages
- 19
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 02/01/2009
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380559202771
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