Journal article
On patent licensing in spatial competition
The Economic record, Vol.80(249), pp.208-218
06/2004
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.2004.00173.x
Abstract
We consider the optimal licensing strategy of an outsider patentee as well as an insider patentee in a linear city framework where firms compete in price. We show that offering royalty is best for an outsider patentee for both drastic and non-drastic innovations. For an insider patentee, offering no license is the best when the innovation is drastic, while royalty is optimal when the innovation is non-drastic. The incentive for innovation is higher for an outsider patentee compared to an insider patentee. The overall increase in welfare due to an innovation is the same for both outsider and insider patentees.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- On patent licensing in spatial competition
- Creators
- Sougata Poddar - Duke-NUS Medical SchoolUday Bhanu Sinha - Indian Statistical Institute
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- The Economic record, Vol.80(249), pp.208-218
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1475-4932.2004.00173.x
- ISSN
- 0013-0249
- eISSN
- 1475-4932
- Number of pages
- 11
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 06/2004
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984963054702771
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