Journal article
On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies
Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.70, pp.147-153
05/01/2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.007
Abstract
This paper studies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered. By relaxing the conventional conditions related to upper semicontinuity and single crossing, we enlarge the class of games to which monotone techniques are applicable. The results are illustrated with a number of economics-related examples.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies
- Creators
- Pavlo Prokopovych - Kyiv School of EconomicsNicholas C. Yannelis - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.70, pp.147-153
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.007
- ISSN
- 0304-4068
- eISSN
- 1873-1538
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 05/01/2017
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380541602771
Metrics
2 Record Views