Journal article
One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures
Games and economic behavior, Vol.31(1), pp.1-25
04/01/2000
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0734
Abstract
We consider a two-period duopoly characterized by a one-way spillover structure in process R&D and a very broad specification of product market competition. We show that a priori identical firms always engage in different levels of R&D, at equilibrium, thus giving rise to an innovator/imitator configuration and ending up with different sizes. We also provide a general analysis of the social benefits of, and firms' incentive for, forming research joint ventures. Another contribution is methodological, illustrating how submodularity (R&D decisions are strategic substitutes) can be exploited to provide a general analysis of a R&D game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, L13, O31.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures
- Creators
- Rabah Amir - Odense UniversityJohn Wooders - University of Arizona
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Games and economic behavior, Vol.31(1), pp.1-25
- Publisher
- Elsevier Inc
- DOI
- 10.1006/game.1999.0734
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
- eISSN
- 1090-2473
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 04/01/2000
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380449902771
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