Journal article
Paternalistic preferences, interpersonal transfers and reciprocity
Southern economic journal, Vol.61(2), pp.379-386
10/01/1994
DOI: 10.2307/1059985
Abstract
How the norm of reciprocity can play a role in supporting transfers as the equilibrium of non-cooperative behavior is demonstrated. An example is given based on the paternalistic preferences model that Robert Pollak (1988) proposed as an extension of Gary Becker's (1981) model of altruism in the family. Where Becker assumes that children's utility levels enter as arguments in their parents' utility function, Pollak assumes that in addition, children's levels of consumption of certain goods directly affect parents' utility. When transfers are between individuals with similar incomes, things become more complicated. In this case, the anticipated effect of a transfer on the recipients' consumption will depend on the giver's expectations about how recipients will spend their own income, including whether they are expected to be foregoing consumption in order to make a transfer themselves. The opportunity cost of making a transfer will likewise depend on these expectations, since the consumption foregone will depend on the transfer received.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Paternalistic preferences, interpersonal transfers and reciprocity
- Creators
- John Solow
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Southern economic journal, Vol.61(2), pp.379-386
- DOI
- 10.2307/1059985
- ISSN
- 0038-4038
- eISSN
- 2325-8012
- Publisher
- Southern Economic Association
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 10/01/1994
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984963526702771
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