Journal article
Phenomenological Laws and Mechanistic Explanations
Philosophy of science, Vol.91(1), pp.132-150
01/01/2024
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.65
Abstract
In light of recent criticisms by Woodward (2017) and Rescorla (2018), we examine the relationship between mechanistic explanation and phenomenological laws. We disambiguate several uses of the phrase "phenomenological law" and show how a mechanistic theory of explanation sorts them into those that are and are not explanatory. We also distinguish the problem of phenomenological laws from arguments about the explanatory power of purely phenomenal models, showing that Woodward and Rescorla conflate these problems. Finally, we argue that the temptation to pit mechanistic and interventionist theories of explanation against one another occludes important and scientifically relevant research questions.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Phenomenological Laws and Mechanistic Explanations
- Creators
- Gabriel Siegel - Washington University in St. LouisCarl F. Craver - Washington University in St. Louis
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Philosophy of science, Vol.91(1), pp.132-150
- DOI
- 10.1017/psa.2023.65
- ISSN
- 0031-8248
- eISSN
- 1539-767X
- Publisher
- Cambridge Univ Press
- Number of pages
- 19
- Grant note
- We thank Stuart Glennan, David Kaplan, Arnon Levy, Mark Povich, James Woodward and two anonymous referees from Philosophy of Science.
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 01/01/2024
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984826360602771
Metrics
10 Record Views