Journal article
Product Innovation and Stability of Collusion
Economics bulletin, Vol.30(2), pp.1392-1400
01/01/2010
Abstract
We study the nature of market competition in relation to stability of collusion in the infinitely repeated play of a twostage game of product innovation and market competition, and show that cooperation in giving R&D efforts is more easily sustained when firms compete in quantity than in price.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Product Innovation and Stability of Collusion
- Creators
- Sougata Poddar - Hanyang UniversityBibhas Saha - University of East Anglia
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economics bulletin, Vol.30(2), pp.1392-1400
- ISSN
- 1545-2921
- eISSN
- 1545-2921
- Publisher
- Economics Bulletin
- Number of pages
- 9
- Grant note
- Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 01/01/2010
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984963153302771
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