Journal article
Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information
Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.43(5), pp.523-531
06/01/2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.001
Abstract
We introduce a new game form which allows the players’ strategies to depend on their strategy-relevant private information as well as on some publicly announced information. The players’ payoffs depend on their own payoff-relevant private information and some payoff-relevant common information. Under the assumption that the players’ strategy-relevant private information is diffuse and their private information is conditionally independent given the public and payoff-relevant common information, we prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for such a game by developing a distribution theory of correspondences via vector measures.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information
- Creators
- Haifeng Fu - National University of SingaporeYeneng Sun - National University of SingaporeNicholas C. Yannelis - University of Illinois Urbana-ChampaignZhixiang Zhang - Johns Hopkins University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.43(5), pp.523-531
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.001
- ISSN
- 0304-4068
- eISSN
- 1873-1538
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 06/01/2007
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380547902771
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