Journal article
RELATIVES AND RELATIVISM
Philosophical studies, Vol.87(2), pp.143-157
08/01/1997
DOI: 10.1023/A:1017930016138
Abstract
[...]we will argue, one must either abandon consequentialism in favor of a deontological view or, if one retains consequentialism, adopt a radical, relativistic version of the view based on a radically relativistic conception of value.1. [...]one could argue that within the framework of relativistic values the right action is the action that maximizes that which has value for any and all of those individuals affected by the action. To be sure, their parents would feel great pain at the loss of their children, but that pain might pale in comparison to the pain a parent would feel upon losing a child whose life she could have saved. [...]in calculating the effects of ones action one must include its effects on ones character, ones dispositions to act in certain ways. [...]as a nonrelativist, she must assign the same value to any action involving similar intimate relationships. Because the consequences of actions can affect the ability of others to fulfill their special obligations, we will always be able to describe hypothetical cases in which consequentialism yields implausible conclusions.It must be emphasized, of course, that the argument here rests on an appeal to intuitions and one might again wonder whether it is so obvious that our intuitions about special obligations will not be affected by the added hypothesis that our fulfilling those obligations prevents others from fulfilling theirs.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- RELATIVES AND RELATIVISM
- Creators
- Diane Jeske - University of IowaRichard Fumerton - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Philosophical studies, Vol.87(2), pp.143-157
- Publisher
- Springer Nature B.V
- DOI
- 10.1023/A:1017930016138
- ISSN
- 0031-8116
- eISSN
- 1573-0883
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 08/01/1997
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984397947202771
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