Journal article
Randomization under ambiguity: Efficiency and incentive compatibility
Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.90, pp.1-11
10/01/2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.004
Abstract
We generalize de Castro and Yannelis (2018) by taking into account the use of randomization. We answer the following questions: Is each efficient allocation of de Castro and Yannelis (2018) still Pareto optimal? Are all efficient allocations still incentive compatible under the Wald’s maxmin preferences? We provide positive answers and give applications.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Randomization under ambiguity: Efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Creators
- Zhiwei Liu - Capital University of Economics and BusinessXinxi Song - Capital University of Economics and BusinessNicholas C. Yannelis - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.90, pp.1-11
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.004
- ISSN
- 0304-4068
- eISSN
- 1873-1538
- Grant note
- 71703110 / National Natural Science Foundation of China (http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001809)
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 10/01/2020
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380508902771
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