Journal article
Reaching for profit in the welfare state: Patrimonial economic voting in Denmark
Electoral studies, Vol.32(3), pp.438-444
09/2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.05.009
Abstract
Economic voting has been well-studied in a number of advanced industrial democracies, including Denmark. However, that work has been almost entirely on the valence dimension, i.e., rewarding or punishing government according to whether the overall economy prospers. Recent work has looked at other economic voting dimensions, including patrimony, i.e., the impact of property ownership on the vote. A patrimonial effect has been found in the UK, the US, and France. However, it seems to differ somewhat depending on the welfare-character of the state, with the US at one end and France at the other. Here we examine patrimonial economic voting in a still more extreme welfare state - Denmark. In our analysis of voting in the 2011 parliamentary election, we establish two new findings: 1. patrimonial economic voting exists in Denmark and, 2. its effect is stronger than that for other countries studied thus far.
•Economic voting has multiple dimensions in Denmark.•Patrimonial economic voting exists in Denmark.•The welfare state characteristics of Denmark condition its economic voting.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Reaching for profit in the welfare state: Patrimonial economic voting in Denmark
- Creators
- Rune Stubager - Aarhus University, Department of Political Science, Bartholins Allé 7, 8000 Aarhus C, DenmarkMichael S Lewis-Beck - University of Iowa, Department of Political Science, Iowa City, IA 52242, USARichard Nadeau - University of Montreal, Department of Political Science, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3C 3J7
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Electoral studies, Vol.32(3), pp.438-444
- Publisher
- Elsevier Ltd
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.05.009
- ISSN
- 0261-3794
- eISSN
- 1873-6890
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 09/2013
- Academic Unit
- Political Science
- Record Identifier
- 9984025663502771
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