Journal article
Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games
Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association, Vol.6(2), pp.181-207
10/2003
DOI: 10.1023/A:1025309121659
Abstract
Learning models predict that the relative speed at which players in a game adjust their behavior has a critical influence on long term behavior. In an ultimatum game, the prediction is that proposers learn not to make small offers faster than responders learn not to reject them. We experimentally test whether relative speed of learning has the predicted effect, by manipulating the amount of experience accumulated by proposers and responders. The experiment allows the predicted learning by responders to be observed, for the first time. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games
- Creators
- David Cooper - Case Western Reserve UniversityNick Feltovich - University of HoustonAlvin Roth - Harvard University PressRami Zwick - Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association, Vol.6(2), pp.181-207
- Publisher
- Springer Nature B.V
- DOI
- 10.1023/A:1025309121659
- ISSN
- 1386-4157
- eISSN
- 1573-6938
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 10/2003
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984420944302771
Metrics
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