Journal article
Research joint ventures, product differentiation, and price collusion
International journal of industrial organization, Vol.20(6), pp.829-854
06/01/2002
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(00)00082-5
Abstract
We investigate the interplay between firms’ decisions in product development, either joint or independent, and their ensuing repeated pricing, either collusive or Bertrand–Nash. A joint venture develops a single product, whereas independent ventures develop their respective products which can be differentiated. We prove that joint product development and the resulting lack of
horizontal product differentiation may destabilise collusion, whilst firms’ R&D decisions have no bearings on collusive sustainability if differentiation is vertical. We also discover the non-monotone dependence of firms’ venture decisions at the development stage upon their time preferences, as well as upon consumers’ willingness to pay.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Research joint ventures, product differentiation, and price collusion
- Creators
- Luca Lambertini - University of BolognaSougata Poddar - Duke-NUS Medical SchoolDan Sasaki - University of Exeter
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- International journal of industrial organization, Vol.20(6), pp.829-854
- DOI
- 10.1016/S0167-7187(00)00082-5
- ISSN
- 0167-7187
- eISSN
- 1873-7986
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- Number of pages
- 26
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 06/01/2002
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984963057502771
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