Journal article
Restraints of trade by durable good producers
Review of industrial organization, Vol.11(3), pp.339-353
06/01/1996
DOI: 10.1007/BF00414403
Abstract
Whether they face competition or not, durable good producers may have an incentive to impose vertical restraints on their customers in order to protect quasi-rents in the aftermarkets for maintenance and repair. In this paper, we show that these vertical restraints have little to do with the usual antitrust concerns regarding tying arrangements. Nonetheless, imposing such restraints involves antitrust risks. We examine these risks and the associated antitrust policy questions in light of the Supreme Court's recent Kodak decision. We also offer some suggestions for the appropriate antitrust policy.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Restraints of trade by durable good producers
- Creators
- Roger Blair - University of FloridaJill Boylston Herndon
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Review of industrial organization, Vol.11(3), pp.339-353
- DOI
- 10.1007/BF00414403
- ISSN
- 0889-938X
- eISSN
- 1573-7160
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 06/01/1996
- Academic Unit
- Public Policy Center (Archive)
- Record Identifier
- 9984283710102771
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