Journal article
Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions
Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.50(1), pp.12-21
01/2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.09.006
Abstract
Should a seller use a multi-unit auction for identical and indivisible units of a good? We show, under specific assumptions on the value distributions of the bidders, that in large markets the multi-unit format generates higher (lower) expected revenue compared to the bundled format when the supply is relatively scarce (abundant). In contrast, a large market is shown to be always more efficient under the multi-unit format than its bundled counterpart. Thus under these assumptions a profit maximizing seller is expected to choose the relatively efficient multi-unit format when supply is scarce.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions
- Creators
- Indranil Chakraborty - Department of Economics, NUS, 1 Arts Link, AS-2#05-36, SingaporeNariankadu D Shyamalkumar - Department of Statistics and Act. Sci., University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.50(1), pp.12-21
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.09.006
- ISSN
- 0304-4068
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 01/2014
- Academic Unit
- Statistics and Actuarial Science
- Record Identifier
- 9983985861902771
Metrics
17 Record Views