Journal article
Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: Incentives and welfare effects
Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.46(5), pp.855-866
09/20/2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.07.001
Abstract
Contrary to much of the existing literature, we obtain robust and clear-cut results for the incentives and welfare effects of information sharing when information is firm-specific. We show that firms’ incentives to share this type of information are aligned with social welfare. Whenever revealing information is the dominant strategy (such as for Cournot firms revealing costs or Cournot and Bertrand firms revealing demand), it is socially beneficial. Only cost information in Bertrand competition will not be revealed but this is socially desirable, too. These findings are independent of distributional assumptions on random shocks and signals and hold for general asymmetric oligopoly with any mixture of substitute, complementary and independent goods.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: Incentives and welfare effects
- Creators
- Rabah Amir - University of ArizonaJim Y. Jin - University of St AndrewsMichael Troege - ESCP Business School
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.46(5), pp.855-866
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.07.001
- ISSN
- 0304-4068
- eISSN
- 1873-1538
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 09/20/2010
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380532902771
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