Journal article
Scientific understanding as narrative intelligibility
Philosophical studies, Vol.181(10), pp.2843-2866
10/01/2024
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02217-4
Abstract
When does a model explain? When does it promote understanding? A dominant approach to scientific explanation is the interventionist view. According to this view, when X explains Y, intervening on X can produce, prevent or alter Y in some predictable way. In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, I reject a position that many interventionist theorists endorse. This position is that to explain some phenomenon by providing a model is also to understand that phenomenon. While endorsing the interventionist view, I argue that explaining and understanding are distinct scientific achievements. Second, I defend a novel theory of scientific understanding. According to this view, when some model M promotes understanding, M makes available a distinctive mental state. This state is of the same psychological kind as when we grasp events in a narrative as bearing on some ultimate conclusion. To conclude, I show that, given this view, mechanistic explanations often provide a powerful source of understanding that many causal-historical models lack. This paper will be of interest to both philosophers of science and epistemologists engaged in the topics of sexplanation and understanding.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Scientific understanding as narrative intelligibility
- Creators
- Gabriel Siegel - Washington Univ St Louis, Dept Philosophy, One Brookings Dr, St Louis, MO 63130 USA
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Philosophical studies, Vol.181(10), pp.2843-2866
- Publisher
- Springer Nature
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11098-024-02217-4
- ISSN
- 0031-8116
- eISSN
- 1573-0883
- Number of pages
- 24
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 10/01/2024
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984827337202771
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