Journal article
Semantic Externalism and the Mechanics of Thought
Minds and machines (Dordrecht), Vol.19(1), pp.1-24
02/2009
DOI: 10.1007/s11023-008-9114-6
Abstract
I review a widely accepted argument to the conclusion that the contents of our beliefs, desires and other mental states cannot be causally efficacious in a classical computational model of the mind. I reply that this argument rests essentially on an assumption about the nature of neural structure that we have no good scientific reason to accept. I conclude that computationalism is compatible with wide semantic causal efficacy, and suggest how the computational model might be modified to accommodate this possibility.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Semantic Externalism and the Mechanics of Thought
- Creators
- Carrie Figdor
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Minds and machines (Dordrecht), Vol.19(1), pp.1-24
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11023-008-9114-6
- ISSN
- 0924-6495
- eISSN
- 1572-8641
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 02/2009
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy; Iowa Neuroscience Institute
- Record Identifier
- 9984065367402771
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