Journal article
Seniority in Legislatures
The American political science review, Vol.86(4), pp.951-965
12/01/1992
DOI: 10.2307/1964347
Abstract
We construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trivial seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Seniority in Legislatures
- Creators
- Richard D. McKelvey - California Institute of TechnologyRaymond Riezman - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- The American political science review, Vol.86(4), pp.951-965
- DOI
- 10.2307/1964347
- ISSN
- 0003-0554
- eISSN
- 1537-5943
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Number of pages
- 15
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 12/01/1992
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984963110302771
Metrics
1 Record Views