Journal article
Settling liability disputes: The effects of asymmetric levels of ambiguity on negotiations
Organizational behavior and human decision processes, Vol.60(1), pp.108-138
10/01/1994
DOI: 10.1006/obhd.1994.1077
Abstract
Past research has found that ambiguity surrounding the alternative to a negotiated settlement can increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement (Hogarth, 1989; Fobian & Christensen-Szalanski, 1993). This study extends the previous research by showing that the extent to which settlement propensity will be affected depends on which of the parties perceives greater ambiguity. In simulated liability settlement negotiations, manipulating whether ambiguity was greater for the defendant or the plaintiff resulted in up to a 69% difference in the number of settlements. The research also suggests that the party with less ambiguity will generally have the advantage in a negotiation situation.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Settling liability disputes: The effects of asymmetric levels of ambiguity on negotiations
- Creators
- Cynthia S. Fobian - Drake UniversityJay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski - Department of Management and Organizations and Center for Health Services Research, University of Iowa, United States
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Organizational behavior and human decision processes, Vol.60(1), pp.108-138
- DOI
- 10.1006/obhd.1994.1077
- ISSN
- 0749-5978
- eISSN
- 1095-9920
- Number of pages
- 31
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 10/01/1994
- Academic Unit
- Management and Entrepreneurship
- Record Identifier
- 9984963042502771
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