Journal article
Shared inputs, over-capitalization, and regulation
Economics letters, Vol.22(4), pp.381-384
1986
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(86)90102-3
Abstract
When inputs are joint in production, a partially regulated firm has the incentive to allocate all joint inputs to the regulated jurisdiction. The regulated firm, if required to allocate costs, will have less of an incentive to over-capitalize.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Shared inputs, over-capitalization, and regulation
- Creators
- Martin F. Grace - University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611, USA
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economics letters, Vol.22(4), pp.381-384
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- DOI
- 10.1016/0165-1765(86)90102-3
- ISSN
- 0165-1765
- eISSN
- 1873-7374
- Number of pages
- 4
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 1986
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Record Identifier
- 9984700651602771
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