Journal article
Situational and Motivational Assumptions in Theories of Coalition Formation
Legislative studies quarterly, Vol.11(4), pp.551-563
11/1986
DOI: 10.2307/439933
Abstract
Positive theories of coalition formation deduce expected behavior from two kinds of assumptions: those concerning the situation under study and those regarding the actors' motivations. To improve their theorizing, scholars must not make these two types of assumptions independently; the characteristics of the setting within which the coalition forms crucially influence what a rational actor can be expected to do. Five types of payoff settings are described here, a typology which clarifies differences among major coalition theories and their realms of applicability. Formal theories of cabinet coalitions require greater attention to the complex nature of the payoffs that political parties and their leaders receive. In studying this and other areas of coalition behavior, theorists must link their motivational assumptions to such important situational assumptions as the nature of payoffs.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Situational and Motivational Assumptions in Theories of Coalition Formation
- Creators
- William M Reisinger
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Legislative studies quarterly, Vol.11(4), pp.551-563
- DOI
- 10.2307/439933
- ISSN
- 0362-9805
- eISSN
- 1939-9162
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 11/1986
- Academic Unit
- Political Science; International Programs
- Record Identifier
- 9983988980602771
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