Journal article
Skepticism and Spatial Objects
International journal for the study of skepticism, Vol.8(2), pp.73-95
05/2018
DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20171199
Abstract
I defend external world realism. I assume that the principle of inference to the best explanation is justified: roughly, a hypothesis that provides a better explanation of the total evidence is more probable than one that does not. I argue that the existence of a world of spatial objects provides a systematic explanation of the spatial contents of visual experience, and that it provides a better explanation than traditional skeptical hypotheses. This paper thus pursues the explanationist strategy of Laurence BonJour and Jonathan Vogel. It is an improved, more compelling defense, for at least two reasons. First, the attention to spatial properties, and in particular to what I call perspectival projections, makes the explanatory power of the realist hypothesis much more vivid and concrete. Second, the argument preserves and elucidates much that seems correct in the explanationist arguments others have offered while avoiding significant problems and shortcomings.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Skepticism and Spatial Objects
- Creators
- Ali Hasan
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- International journal for the study of skepticism, Vol.8(2), pp.73-95
- Publisher
- Brill; Leiden
- DOI
- 10.1163/22105700-20171199
- ISSN
- 2210-5697
- eISSN
- 2210-5700
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 05/2018
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984002461802771
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