Journal article
Stable sets for asymmetric information economies
International journal of economic theory, Vol.11(1), pp.137-154
03/2015
DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12057
Abstract
An exchange economy with asymmetrically informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that regulates the information sharing among agents. In this context, the notion of stable sets à la von Neumann and Morgenstern is analyzed. Two different frameworks are taken into account as regards preferences: a model without expectations and a model with expected utilities. For the former, it is shown that the set V of all individually rational, Pareto optimal, symmetric allocations is the unique stable set of symmetric allocations. For the latter, an example is presented which shows that the same set V is not externally stable and a weaker result is proved.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Stable sets for asymmetric information economies
- Creators
- Maria Gabriella Graziano - University of Naples Federico IIClaudia Meo - University of Naples Federico IINicholas C. Yannelis - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- International journal of economic theory, Vol.11(1), pp.137-154
- Publisher
- Blackwell Publishing Ltd
- DOI
- 10.1111/ijet.12057
- ISSN
- 1742-7355
- eISSN
- 1742-7363
- Number of pages
- 18
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 03/2015
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380506002771
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