Stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences

Maria Gabriella Graziano; Claudia Meo; Nicholas C. Yannelis

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.017

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Stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences

Journal article

Peer reviewed

Stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences

Maria Gabriella Graziano, Claudia Meo and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Journal of economic behavior & organization, Vol.140, pp.267-286

08/2017

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.017

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Abstract

We introduce the notion of stable sets with externalities and prove its existence. Stable sets provide a successful alternative to core notions of externalities (i.e., α-core, β-core and strong Nash equilibrium), which are typically empty. However, the stable sets do exist in situations where the above core notions are empty.

Core

Interdependent preferences

Stable sets

Types of agents

Details

Title: Subtitle: Stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences
Creators: Maria Gabriella Graziano - University of Naples Federico II
Claudia Meo - University of Naples Federico II
Nicholas C. Yannelis - Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa, USA
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Journal of economic behavior & organization, Vol.140, pp.267-286
Publisher: Elsevier B.V
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.017
ISSN: 0167-2681
eISSN: 1879-1751
Language: English
Date published: 08/2017
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9984380389702771

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