Stand by Me-Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games

Jordi Brandts; David J. Cooper; Enrique Fatas; Shi Qi

doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2269

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Stand by Me-Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games

Journal article

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Stand by Me-Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games

Jordi Brandts, David J. Cooper, Enrique Fatas and Shi Qi

Management science, Vol.62(10), pp.2916-2936

10/01/2016

DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2269

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Abstract

We present experiments studying how high-ability individuals use help to foster efficient coordination. After an initial phase that traps groups in a low-productivity equilibrium, incentives to coordinate are increased, making it possible to escape this performance trap. The design varies whether high-ability individuals can offer help and, if so, whether they must commit to help for an extended period. If help is chosen on a round-by-round basis, the probability of escaping the performance trap is slightly reduced by allowing for help. The likelihood of success significantly improves if high-ability individuals must commit to help for an extended time. We develop and estimate a structural model of sophisticated learning that provides an explanation for why commitment is necessary. The key insight is that potential leaders who are overly optimistic about their ability to teach their followers are too fast to eliminate help in the absence of commitment.

Business & Economics

Management

Operations Research & Management Science

Science & Technology

Social Sciences

Technology

Details

Title: Subtitle: Stand by Me-Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games
Creators: Jordi Brandts - Barcelona School of Economics
David J. Cooper - Florida State Univ, Dept Econ, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA
Enrique Fatas - University of East Anglia
Shi Qi - Florida State University
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Management science, Vol.62(10), pp.2916-2936
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2269
ISSN: 0025-1909
eISSN: 1526-5501
Publisher: Informs
Number of pages: 21
Grant note: ECO2014-59302-P / Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation; Ministry of Science and Innovation, Spain (MICINN); Spanish Government SES-0214310; SES-1127704 / National Science Foundation; National Science Foundation (NSF) ES/K002201/1 / ESRC; UK Research & Innovation (UKRI); Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) Barcelona GSE Research Network 2014 SGR 510 / Generalitat de Catalunya ES/K002201/1 / Economic and Social Research Council; UK Research & Innovation (UKRI); Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC)
Language: English
Date published: 10/01/2016
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9984420847702771

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