Journal article
Supergames Played by Finite Automata with Finite Costs of Complexity in an Evolutionary Setting
Journal of economic theory, Vol.68(1), pp.266-275
01/1996
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0015
Abstract
I examine a model of finite automata playing the repeated prisoners dilemma in an evolutionary setting, similar to that developed by Binmore and Samuelson. The only alteration made to the model is the use of finite costs of complexity, as opposed to lexicographic costs of complexity. The results of Binmore and Samuelson are not robust to this change. Using finite costs of complexity, a folk theorem result is proved in place of the uniqueness result of Binmore and Samuelson.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C70.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Supergames Played by Finite Automata with Finite Costs of Complexity in an Evolutionary Setting
- Creators
- David J. Cooper - University of Pittsburgh
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of economic theory, Vol.68(1), pp.266-275
- Publisher
- Elsevier Inc
- DOI
- 10.1006/jeth.1996.0015
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
- eISSN
- 1095-7235
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 01/1996
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984420841402771
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