Journal article
Symmetric versus asymmetric equilibria in symmetric supermodular games
International journal of game theory, Vol.37(3), pp.307-320
11/01/2008
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-008-0118-5
Abstract
This paper investigates the general properties of symmetric n-player supermodular games with complete-lattice action spaces. In particular, we examine the extent to which all pure strategy Nash equilibria tend to be symmetric for the general case of multi-dimensional strategy spaces. As asymmetric equilibria are possible even for strictly supermodular games, we investigate whether some symmetric equilibrium would always Pareto dominate all asymmetric equilibria. While this need not hold in general, we identify different sufficient conditions, each of which guarantees that such dominance holds: 2-player games with scalar action sets, uni-signed externalities, identical interests, and superjoin payoffs. Various illustrative examples are provided. Finally, some economic applications are discussed.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Symmetric versus asymmetric equilibria in symmetric supermodular games
- Creators
- Rabah Amir - University of ArizonaMichal Jakubczyk - Warsaw Sch Econ, PL-02554 Warsaw, PolandMalgorzata Knauff - SGH Warsaw School of Economics
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- International journal of game theory, Vol.37(3), pp.307-320
- Publisher
- Springer Nature
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00182-008-0118-5
- ISSN
- 0020-7276
- eISSN
- 1432-1270
- Number of pages
- 14
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 11/01/2008
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380441202771
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