Journal article
Symmetry-breaking in two-player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity: A synthesis
Journal of economic theory, Vol.145(5), pp.1968-1986
09/01/2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.013
Abstract
This paper is an attempt to develop a unified approach to symmetry-breaking in strategic models arising in industrial organization by constructing two general classes of two-player symmetric games that always possess only asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. These classes of games are characterized in some abstract sense by two general properties: payoff nonconcavities and some form of strategic substitutability. Our framework relies on easily verified assumptions on the primitives of the game, and relies on the theory of supermodular games. The underlying natural assumptions are satisfied in a number of two-stage models with an investment decision preceding product market competition. To illustrate the generality and wide scope for application of our approach, we present some existing models dealing with R&D, capacity expansion and information provision, which motivated this study. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Symmetry-breaking in two-player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity: A synthesis
- Creators
- Rabah Amir - University of ArizonaFilomena Garcia - University of LisbonMalgorzata Knauff - SGH Warsaw School of Economics
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of economic theory, Vol.145(5), pp.1968-1986
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.013
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
- eISSN
- 1095-7235
- Number of pages
- 19
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 09/01/2010
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380522102771
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