Journal article
The Effect of Task Interdependence and Type of Incentive Contract on Group Performance
Journal of management accounting research, Vol.20(s1), pp.1-18
01/01/2008
DOI: 10.2308/jmar.2008.20.s-1.1
Abstract
We extend Fisher et al. (2003) to investigate the effectiveness of a budget-based incentive contract to settings with alternate task characteristics. We first replicate their finding: when groups perform a task with an additive production function, a budget-based contract leads to higher levels of performance than a piece-rate contract. However, we do not find higher performance when we modify the task to be interdependent, arguably a key feature of group tasks. We also show that goal commitment mediates the incentive contract-performance relation for tasks with an additive production function. Collectively, these results suggest that variations in production technology influence the relative motivational effectiveness of different incentive plans.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- The Effect of Task Interdependence and Type of Incentive Contract on Group Performance
- Creators
- Ronald N. Guymon - University of IowaRamji Balakrishnan - University of IowaRichard M. Tubbs - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of management accounting research, Vol.20(s1), pp.1-18
- DOI
- 10.2308/jmar.2008.20.s-1.1
- ISSN
- 1049-2127
- eISSN
- 1558-8033
- Publisher
- Amer Accounting Assoc
- Number of pages
- 18
- Grant note
- RSM McGladrey Institute for Accounting Education and Research
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 01/01/2008
- Academic Unit
- Accounting
- Record Identifier
- 9984380595602771
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