Journal article
The Filibuster as a War of Attrition
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.59(3), pp.569-595
08/01/2016
DOI: 10.1086/690223
Abstract
Contrary to popular claims, we argue that the filibuster conveys meaningful information about participants’ willingness to fight for an issue. To this end, we present a model of the filibuster as a continuous-time, two-sided game of incomplete information and derive predictions about the frequency and hazards of observed filibusters. We show that informative signaling in the model can be detected by the presence of a specific mixture over distinct duration processes. Using a new estimator consistent with these predictions, we find that the filibuster has historically conveyed information and that it continues to do so, counter to many claims. In addition, the model explains variations in the frequency and duration of filibusters, including the puzzling increase in filibustering after rule changes easing the adoption of cloture.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- The Filibuster as a War of Attrition
- Creators
- Douglas DionFrederick J BoehmkeWilliam MacMillanCharles R Shipan
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.59(3), pp.569-595
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI
- 10.1086/690223
- ISSN
- 0022-2186
- eISSN
- 1537-5285
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 08/01/2016
- Academic Unit
- Political Science; Public Policy Center (Archive)
- Record Identifier
- 9983982717102771
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