Journal article
The dynamics of responder behavior in ultimatum games: a meta-study
Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association, Vol.14(4), pp.519-546
11/01/2011
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-011-9280-x
Abstract
Using data aggregated from seven papers that study repeated play in standard ultimatum games with either stranger or absolute stranger matching, we show that the behavior of responders changes with experience. High offers are more likely to be accepted with experience and low offers are more likely to be rejected. At the individual level, there is a negative relationship between the likelihood that a given offer is accepted and the size of the preceding offer. We compare the results with predictions generated by static models of distributional preferences, implicitly dynamic models of preferences with reciprocity, and explicitly dynamic models of adaptive learning. The data is most consistent with models of preferences with reciprocity .[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- The dynamics of responder behavior in ultimatum games: a meta-study
- Creators
- David Cooper - Florida State UniversityE Dutcher
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association, Vol.14(4), pp.519-546
- Publisher
- Springer Nature B.V
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10683-011-9280-x
- ISSN
- 1386-4157
- eISSN
- 1573-6938
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 11/01/2011
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984420934802771
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