Journal article
The role of investment banker directors in M&A
Journal of financial economics, Vol.112(2), pp.269-286
05/01/2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.02.003
Abstract
We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect firms׳ acquisition behavior. We find that firms with investment bankers on the board have a higher probability of making acquisitions. Furthermore, acquirers with investment banker directors experience higher announcement returns, pay lower takeover premiums and advisory fees, and exhibit superior long-run performance. Overall, our results suggest that directors with investment banking experience help firms make better acquisitions, both by identifying suitable targets and by reducing the cost of the deals.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- The role of investment banker directors in M&A
- Creators
- Qianqian Huang - City University of Hong KongFeng Jiang - State University of New YorkErik Lie - University of IowaKe Yang - Lehigh University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of financial economics, Vol.112(2), pp.269-286
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.02.003
- ISSN
- 0304-405X
- eISSN
- 1879-2774
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 05/01/2014
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Record Identifier
- 9984380389902771
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