Journal article
The trade-offs of fighting and investing: A model of the evolution of war and peace
Conflict management and peace science, Vol.25(2), pp.152-170
2008
DOI: 10.1080/07388940802007272
Abstract
International competition occurs in many different forms. Just as a state would be in danger if it allowed its opponent to gain a military advantage, one that falls behind a rival in an economic contest similarly faces risks. States must weigh the trade-offs between economic and military growth, as well as deciding on the best strategy to follow should war erupt. We use a formal, dynamic model to explicitly capture the trade-offs that states face in their search for security and dominance. The deductions from the model demonstrate that by considering the long-run results of a peacetime rivalry, weaker states might conclude that their only hope of winning or surviving a rivalry lies in fighting a counterforce war, explain why and how stalemates evolve during counterforce wars, and indicate that targeting industrial objectives shortens the duration of wars.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- The trade-offs of fighting and investing: A model of the evolution of war and peace
- Creators
- Kelly M KaderaDaniel S Morey
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Conflict management and peace science, Vol.25(2), pp.152-170
- DOI
- 10.1080/07388940802007272
- ISSN
- 1549-9219
- eISSN
- 1549-9219
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 2008
- Academic Unit
- International Programs; Political Science
- Record Identifier
- 9983983391302771
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