Journal article
Trust, reciprocity, and social history
Games and economic behavior, Vol.10(1), pp.122-142
07/01/1995
DOI: 10.1006/game.1995.1027
Abstract
We designed an experiment to study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting. This design controls for alternative explanations of behavior including repeat game reputation effects, contractual precommitments, and punishment threats. Observed decisions suggest that reciprocity exists as a basic element of human behavior and that this is accounted for in the trust extended to an anonymous counterpart. A second treatment, social history, identifies conditions which strengthen the relationship between trust and reciprocity.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Trust, reciprocity, and social history
- Creators
- Joyce Berg - University of IowaJohn Dickhaut - University of IowaKevin McCabe - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Games and economic behavior, Vol.10(1), pp.122-142
- DOI
- 10.1006/game.1995.1027
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
- eISSN
- 1090-2473
- Number of pages
- 21
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 07/01/1995
- Academic Unit
- Accounting
- Record Identifier
- 9984962889802771
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