Journal article
Two heads are safer than one: Changes in CEO duality and venture failure
Long range planning, Vol.55(4), p.102218
08/01/2022
DOI: 10.1016/j.lrp.2022.102218
Abstract
We study the dynamics of a major design choice in the governance of ventures: whether to distribute power at the top of the venture between a separate CEO and board chair. We propose that ventures are more likely to combine (separate) their CEO and chair positions when operational performance is poor (strong), demonstrating behavior in line with the threat rigidity thesis. Paradoxically, however, ventures would most benefit from a separate CEO and board chair when operational performance is poor. Empirical analysis of data from the Australian mining industry offers general support for our theory, with some interesting nuances. We discuss the implications of our findings for emerging conversations in the literatures on venture boards, boards of directors, and entrepreneurship.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Two heads are safer than one: Changes in CEO duality and venture failure
- Creators
- Ryan Krause - Texas Christian UniversityRene M. Bakker - Erasmus University RotterdamJoris Knoben - Tilburg University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Long range planning, Vol.55(4), p.102218
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.lrp.2022.102218
- ISSN
- 0024-6301
- eISSN
- 1873-1872
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Number of pages
- 15
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 08/01/2022
- Academic Unit
- Management and Entrepreneurship
- Record Identifier
- 9984936814802771
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