Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly: Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly

Rabah Amir; Igor V. Evstigneev; Valeriya Potapova

doi:10.1007/s40505-025-00305-0

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Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly: Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly

Journal article

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Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly: Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly

Rabah Amir, Igor V. Evstigneev and Valeriya Potapova

Economic theory bulletin, Vol.14(1), 2

06/01/2026

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-025-00305-0

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Abstract

The paper analyzes unbeatable strategies in a Cournot duopoly model with differentiated goods. We conduct an extensive comparative analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibrium strategies and unbeatable ones in this framework. This article focuses on an asymmetric model, extending the results previously obtained in the symmetric case.

Economics

Game Theory

Public Finance

Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods

Economics and Finance

Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics

Research Article

Social and Behav. Sciences

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Details

Title: Subtitle: Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly: Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly
Creators: Rabah Amir - Department of Economics, University of Iowa
Igor V. Evstigneev - University of Manchester
Valeriya Potapova - Validus Risk Management
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Economic theory bulletin, Vol.14(1), 2
DOI: 10.1007/s40505-025-00305-0
ISSN: 2196-1085
eISSN: 2196-1093
Publisher: Springer Nature
Language: English
Date published: 06/01/2026
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9985090583802771

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