Journal article
Veto players and foreign aid provision
Constitutional Political Economy, Vol.24(1), pp.43-56
03/2013
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-012-9131-6
Abstract
This study investigates how the political institutions of developed economies influence their foreign assistance. Specifically, we argue that the number of effective veto players has a negative effect on the volume of aid provision. To provide foreign assistance, the incumbent government in a donor country must have unanimous support from all effective veto players in policy making. Thus, it has more barriers to overcome when the polity is characterized by many and preference-wise heterogeneous veto players. By examining the official development assistance outflows of 27 OECD countries for the period of 1977–2006, we find empirical patterns that corroborate our argument.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Veto players and foreign aid provision
- Creators
- Yu Wang - Department of Government and Public Administration Chinese University of Hong Kong Shatin New Territories Hong KongShuai Jin - Department of Government and Public Administration Chinese University of Hong Kong Shatin New Territories Hong Kong
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Constitutional Political Economy, Vol.24(1), pp.43-56
- Publisher
- Springer US; Boston
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10602-012-9131-6
- ISSN
- 1043-4062
- eISSN
- 1572-9966
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 03/2013
- Academic Unit
- Political Science
- Record Identifier
- 9983920520002771
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