Journal article
YABLO'S PARADOX AND RUSSELLIAN PROPOSITIONS
Russell, Vol.28(2), pp.127-142
12/01/2008
DOI: 10.15173/russell.v28i2.2140
Abstract
Is self-reference necessary for the production of Liar paradoxes? Yablo has given an argument that self-reference is not necessary. He hopes to show that the indexical apparatus of self-reference of the traditional Liar paradox can be avoided by appealing to a list, a consecutive sequence, of sentences correlated one-one with natural numbers. Yablo opens his "Paradox without Self-Reference" (Analysis, 1993) with the assumption that there is a sequence Such that:
S(n): "(for all k)(k > n . --> . (sic)True inverted right perpendicularS(k)inverted left perpendicular)"
Each sentence on Yablo's list is supposed to be correlated one-one with number n. Each sentence is supposed to say that for every natural number k greater than n, the k-th sentence on the list is not true. By comparing Yablo's construction to an analogous construction with early Russellian propositions, we show that Yablo has failed to generate a paradox.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- YABLO'S PARADOX AND RUSSELLIAN PROPOSITIONS
- Creators
- Gregory Landini - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Russell, Vol.28(2), pp.127-142
- Publisher
- Betrand Russell Research Centre
- DOI
- 10.15173/russell.v28i2.2140
- ISSN
- 0036-0163
- eISSN
- 1913-8032
- Number of pages
- 16
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 12/01/2008
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984397945702771
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