Journal article
Zetetic rights and wrong(ing)s
The Philosophical quarterly, Vol.75(4), pp.1321-1343
10/15/2025
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqaf015
Abstract
What do we owe those with whom we inquire? Presumably, quite a bit. Anything beyond what is necessary to secure knowledge? Yes. In this paper, I argue for a class of 'zetetic rights.' These are rights distinctive to participants in group inquiry. Zetetic rights help protect important central interests of inquirers. These include a right to aid, a right against interference, and a right to exert influence over the course of inquiry. Building on arguments by Fricker, I defend these rights, and explore cases of their violation: zetetic wrongings. I argue that zetetic wrongings constitute a distinctive, ubiquitous, and significant form of injustice in our epistemic and zetetic lives. To improve our inquiries and avoid epistemic injustice, we need to contend with zetetic wronging. Making this case helps show that a complete picture of epistemic life must account for the deep influence of our cooperative ties to one another.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Zetetic rights and wrong(ing)s
- Creators
- Daniel C. Friedman - Stanford University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- The Philosophical quarterly, Vol.75(4), pp.1321-1343
- DOI
- 10.1093/pq/pqaf015
- ISSN
- 0031-8094
- eISSN
- 1467-9213
- Publisher
- Oxford Univ Press
- Number of pages
- 23
- Language
- English
- Electronic publication date
- 02/11/2025
- Date published
- 10/15/2025
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984958634302771
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