A Stackelberg Game Model of Flocking

Chenlan Wang; Mehrdad Moharrami; Mingyan Liu

doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.19678

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A Stackelberg Game Model of Flocking

Chenlan Wang, Mehrdad Moharrami and Mingyan Liu

ArXiv.org

Cornell University

07/28/2024

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2407.19678

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Abstract

We study a Stackelberg game to examine how two agents determine to cooperate while competing with each other. Each selects an arrival time to a destination, the earlier one fetching a higher reward. There is, however, an inherent penalty in arriving too early as well as a risk in traveling alone. This gives rise to the possibility of the agents cooperating by traveling together while competing for the reward. In our prior work [1] we studied this problem as a sequential game among a set of N competing agents in continuous time, and defined the formation of a group traveling together as arriving at exactly the same time. In the present study, we relax this definition to allow arrival times within a small window, and study a 2-agent game in both continuous and discrete time, referred to as the flock formation game. We derive and examine the properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this game.

Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory

Details

Title: Subtitle: A Stackelberg Game Model of Flocking
Creators: Chenlan Wang
Mehrdad Moharrami
Mingyan Liu
Resource Type: Preprint
Publication Details: ArXiv.org
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2407.19678
ISSN: 2331-8422
Publisher: Cornell University; Ithaca, New York
Language: English
Date posted: 07/28/2024
Academic Unit: Computer Science
Record Identifier: 9984689159702771

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