Logo image
Back
University-Firm Competition in Basic Research: Simultaneous Vs Sequential Moves
Preprint   Open access

University-Firm Competition in Basic Research: Simultaneous Vs Sequential Moves

Rabah Amir, Evangelia Chalioti and Christine Halmenschlager
SSRN
10/28/2021
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4345627
url
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12552View
Published (Version of record)This article has now been published in a journal and has been peer-reviewed by subject experts. This version may differ significantly from the preprint version. Access restricted to faculty, staff and students
url
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4345627View
Preprint (Author's original)This preprint has not been evaluated by subject experts through peer review. Preprints may undergo extensive changes and/or become peer-reviewed journal articles. Open Access

Related content

Is preprint of

Abstract

This paper studies the endogenous timing of moves in a game with competition in basic research between a university and a commercial firm. It examines the conditions under which the two entities end up investing in innovation at equilibrium, both under simultaneous and sequential moves. It argues that when the innovation process is not too costly, under any timing, the firm conducts research despite the opportunities for complete free-riding. The two sequential move games with either player as leader emerge as equilibrium endogenous timings, with both entities realizing higher profits in either outcome than in a simultaneous move game. Each entity also profits more by following than by leading. Finally, as a proxy for a welfare analysis, we compare the propensities for innovation across the three scenarios and find that university leadership yields a superior performance. This may be used as a selection criterion to choose the latter scenario as the unique outcome of endogenous timing
 basic research endogenous timing university-firm relations

Details

Metrics

6 Record Views
Logo image