Report
Strategic advance production without Stackelberg leadership
Research paper (University of Melbourne. Department of Economics), no. 667, University of Melbourne, Department of Economics
1998
Abstract
Advance production served as a means of quantity commitment. This paper shows that the pre-emption acts as strategic substitutes between oligopolists. We also show that a firm's incentive for advance production arises only if it has a quantity-setting opponent, irrespective of the firm's own strategic variable (i.e., price or quantity) and the characteristics of the concered products (i.e. substitutes or complements).
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Strategic advance production without Stackelberg leadership
- Creators
- Sougata PoddarDan Sasaki
- Resource Type
- Report
- Series
- Research paper (University of Melbourne. Department of Economics); no. 667
- ISBN
- 0732509246; 9780732509248
- Publisher
- University of Melbourne, Department of Economics; Parkville, Victoria
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 1998
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984963542402771
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