From Akrasia to Quality of Will: A Critical Examination of Accounts of Moral Responsibility and Ignorance

This work will survey and explore a modest sample of the literature concerning moral responsibility and instances of morally consequential ignorance. This work will primarily critically examine the viability of certain posited accounts of moral responsibility for actions done under ignorance with a heavy methodological emphasis on case analysis. From leading Akratics to varied Quality-of-Will views (and some accounts in between), there will be an attempt to make sense of and to challenge these distinct views on moral responsibility. To be clear, the aim herein will be mostly critical. Moving from exposition on and presentation of the basic conflicts arising in cases of morally consequential ignorance in general, there will be a step-wise examination of Akratic, Quality-of-will, and intermediary accounts. Each account will be shown to have its unique set of problems and strengths and the overall viability of each account will be questioned. But ultimately, what emerges from this brief and focused survey is a broad and cross-theoretical understanding of the true challenges (two in particular) facing positive accounts of moral responsibility for ignorance.